for India provided by the Henry Hyde Act. Whether or not it is feasible to evacuate all or a majority of the reactors facilitated by the deal in the event India tests, the fuel cut off that is bound to follow (like the Tarapur crisis) will paralyze all the connected commerce and industry. That unstated but ever-present risk to growth will baulk India from ever testing, and an untested, obsolescing deterrent is worse in some ways than no deterrence. The pro-dealers say that that risk is always there. True. But that produces a self-imposed moratorium, as now. The deal binds India, hands and feet, to never testing. The deal only assures fuel for normal reactor operation, no reserve. The IAEA won’t go beyond this, nor will the NSG. Indeed, the NSG sanction for nuclear commerce with India has to mirror the US deal.
The fuel will be low enriched uranium for the common commercial light water reactors that will be imported under the deal, thirty-some reactors costing about $1000 billion. By the DEA’s own estimate, uranium reserves worldwide won’t last sixty years. That estimate was made some years ago before China became hungry for nuclear power. A US study lasted the reserves longer, but only if the reactor numbers did not dramatically increase. With conditions for peak oil rapidly approaching, environmental concerns growing, and commodities inflation taking firm roots, the shift to nuclear power is being strenuously campaigned for by the US. Already commanding a high price bec
