In my view, this is more of a Data access issue, where there would possibly be bottlenecks to access, monitoring and retrieval of archived data, in cases where connections / users need to be accessed / monitored for cyber crimes. In layman%u2019s term, the services of RIM are very simple: The messaging systems of various corporate organizations, sync up with Black Berry servers that sit on their own corporate network. This data, is taken up by the Black Berry servers, encrypted and tunneled to one of the two NOC%u2019s (Network Operating Centers) of RIM%u2019s services, which are essentially large data centers (one in Canada for the western hemisphere and the other at UK for the rest of the world). The NOC%u2019s are effectively messengers, which address the authentication of the users and sends the relevant data on its way to the concerned handheld devices. Because user authentication is handled by RIM away from the corporate network, it protects companies from hackers who may try to obtain information through e-mail servers, which sit inside the company's firewall. RIM's approach also means that corporate IT departments don't have to juggle relationships with multiple mobile operators because RIM handles all of that for them in the NOC. So, from a IT Security perspective and security of corporate data front, the services are well fortified. The issue really may reside at the end of the governing bodies, where, there may be procedural wrangles coming in the way
